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ABSTRACT 
 
Political strategies of external support to democratization are contrasted and critically examined in 
respect of the United States and European Union. The analysis begins by defining its terms of reference 
and addresses the question of what it means to have a strategy. The account briefly notes the goals 
lying behind democratization support and their relationship to the wider foreign policy process, before 
considering what a successful strategy would look like and how that relates to the selection of 
candidates. The literature’s attempts to identify strategy and its recommendations for better strategies 
are compared and assessed. Overall the article argues that the question of political strategies of external 
support for democratization raises several distinct but related issues including the who?, what?, why? 
and how? On one level strategic choices can be expected to echo the comparative advantage of the 
‘supporter’.  On a different level the strategies cannot be divorced from the larger foreign policy 
framework. While it is correct to say that any sound strategy for support should be grounded in a 
theoretical understanding of democratization, the literature on strategies reveals something even more 
fundamental: divergent views about the nature of politics itself. The recommendations there certainly 
pinpoint weaknesses in the actual strategies of the US and Europe but they have their own limitations 
too.  In particular, in a world of increasing multi-level governance strategies for supporting 
democratization should go beyond preoccupation with just an ‘outside-in’ approach. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In its World Development Report 2004 the World Bank says international support for promoting 
democracy has increased tenfold, from 0.5 per cent of official development assistance in 1991 to 5 per 
cent in 2000, or a grand total of approximately around US$3 billion annually. Democracy related 
assistance by the United States is now over $800 million annually; European efforts are comparable. 
The sums look set to increase following President Bush’s declared intention to use his second term to 
promote freedom and democracy abroad; the Europeans will not want to be left behind. So, 
democratization support is an established and growing industry. Yet in a survey of 40 democracies’ 
efforts to protect and promote democracy abroad only three countries – Canada, Netherlands and 
Sweden - were rated ‘very good’ (Democracy Coalition Project, 2002). Thus it seems there is scope to 
do better.  
 
In reality there is much about the practice of external democracy promotion that we do not know. For 
although a few writers have described the activities in some detail and ventured to rule on their 
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effectiveness (on the United States’ efforts see especially Carothers, 1997 and 1999; on the European 
Union see for example Crawford, 2000), methodologies for measuring outcomes and impact remain 
rudimentary. Only now is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in 
conjunction with the US Social Science Research Council endeavouring to devise a credible research 
design for evaluating its democracy and governance programming: the qualitative data-gathering is 
projected to take place over 2005 to 2008. USAID is probably well ahead of the rest of the field (but 
for a pioneering independent assessment of The National Endowment for Democracy’s efforts see 
Scott and Steele, forthcoming 2005). By focussing on strategy this article seeks not to replicate or 
second-guess the empirical analysis of democracy projects and programmes but instead proceeds from 
the belief that to explain and improve on the situation described by the Democracy Coalition Project 
(2002), strategy holds the key. 
 
At its maximum political strategies of external support for democratization cover a large unwieldy 
canvas. First, democratization itself is a heavily contested and value-laden idea, which means there are 
competing and wide-ranging alternatives on offer in the literature. Views differ over whether 
democratization should be defined in purely political terms or instead must refer to equalising social 
and economic processes too. Major disagreements exist over the adequacy of minimalist accounts that 
define democratization in terms of the establishment of certain procedures for producing governments 
such as free and fair elections based on universal suffrage without requiring more substantive political 
equality or making heavy demands on political participation by society. By comparison there is more 
agreement that political liberalization means an increase of civil liberties without the introduction of 
competitive multi-party politics and free and fair elections; liberalization is often a strategy employed 
by authoritarian regimes to avoid democratic opening. Yet democracies too can be illiberal. And so a 
particularly useful classification is Diamond’s (1996: 21-25) distinction between electoral democracy 
and liberal democracy. The second makes more extensive provision for political and civic pluralism, 
and is committed to the rule of law. The former does not offer security to civil liberties and minority 
rights. Progression towards liberal democracy, which involves attitudinal and behavioural as well as 
formal organisational changes, is the mainstream understanding of democratization. For the most part 
that is what the international democracy promotion industry aspires to bring about. So it is that 
understanding which underlies this article. However, some critics even interpret that commitment as 
little more than furthering an elitist form of government that prevents a more radical transformation of 
power relations. For such critics only the full empowerment of the people can effectively challenge the 
dominance of transnational capital, which for them is democratization truly requires (Robinson 1996). 
The very normative content of what is being promoted by external support for democratization is, then, 
contestable. In regard to critical theory it is debatable whether there would be a role for the established 
liberal democracies to play, or what such a role might be, in supporting alternative democratic models 
that are untried and untested and seem unlikely to be adopted in the West. Notwithstanding it value, 
however, the normative debate lies outside the scope of this article, which has the more limited goal of 
investigating the actualité of international democratization support on the basis of what that support 
adopts as its objective.  
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 Democratization could be supported in many different ways, both directly and indirectly - for instance 
helping society to develop the economic underpinnings that, if not essential to democratic transition 
may well influence both a democracy’s quality and its long-run survival. Indeed, for some fashionable 
theories that treat politics as the dependent variable, and more particularly those that regard the 
development of material forces of production as the principal determinant of political life, the only 
sensible strategy for supporting democratization would be to address economic issues first. The point 
can be put rather differently: after society has moved against authoritarianism the best strategy for 
supporting democratization is to ensure that the people enjoy a ‘democracy dividend’ - an economic 
pay-off - to reduce the likelihood of there being a return to the ways of the past.  A variant of the 
economic approach extols the benefits of pursuing economic liberalization first, on the reasoning that 
economic freedoms and economic markets facilitate the institutionalisation of their political 
counterparts. However, ‘political strategies’ can also be interpreted more narrowly, to exclude ways of 
pursuing democratization via either economic or social development generally or through applying 
neo-liberal economic solutions to development problems more specifically. Attempts to impose 
democracy by way of the barrel of a gun are more military than political strategies of support.  
 
The word external in support to democratization conjures up a big field too. It denotes many actors of 
various types – governments, regional and larger inter-governmental organisations, quasi-independent 
and non-governmental organisations, commercial and not-for-profit – all seeking to influence the 
prospects for democracy within countries. The number of such actors based in Europe, the United 
States and elsewhere has increased considerably over the last 15 years. The Organisation for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe has been a central actor in the Balkans for instance, and the United Nations 
(UN) too is increasingly involved (see Newman and Rich, 2005). No single democracy promotion 
agency operates in a vacuum. Nevertheless if only to make this inquiry more manageable the number 
of actors and unit of analysis used for illustration here will be the US and the European Union, rather 
than the multitude of individual democratization support agencies. Unlike the US the EU is not (yet) a 
state but there has long been a recognition that it conducts external actions, even if until recently it has 
lacked a comparable, institutionally-grounded foreign policy capability. That said, neither actor should 
be viewed as monolithic. Indeed, policy choices including those for foreign policy can be understood as 
the product of complex strategic bargaining among interested parties – actors concerned about their 
relative power within the institutional matrix, and not necessarily giving priority to policies that will be 
most rational for the whole (Milner, 1998: 779; 785).  For instance Europe’s strategies for democracy 
support are said to have emerged from ‘strikingly inchoate decision-making processes. Rather than…a 
sophisticated and carefully reasoned conceptual approach, arbitrary accidentalism abounds’. (Youngs, 
2004a:13). The situation in the complex bureaucracy of the US federal government may not be vastly 
different. 
 
Furthermore, just as the state of relations among the external agencies would form a central analytical 
component of a global political strategy for international support, so we should not compartmentalise 
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actors into either external or internal, foreign or domestic. These dichotomies are unhelpful in a world 
increasingly characterised by outsider-inside relationships and coalitions, where the substance of inter-
actor relations across borders is often what determines outcomes. So although strategy will be 
discussed here in terms of the approaches of two major actors, a reasonable argument is that greater 
inter-agency co-ordination (including an appropriate division of responsibilities between official and 
non-governmental actors) and much closer co-operation between the US and Europe might produce 
more effective support. Some observers believe such developments would give greater legitimacy to 
the whole enterprise, especially if the US and EU were to co-operate more closely with the UN and 
other inter-governmental actors that have regional standing, like the Organisation of American  States. 
Others might see in such ‘ganging up’ a powerful new imperialism and for that reason be less 
receptive. And in practice the argument could turn out to be academic. For although the US and Europe 
do seem to be converging in some aspects of culture, society, economy and, arguably, political 
ideology, in the post-cold war environment their long-term geopolitical interests could now begin to 
pull part. In time that may have profound implications for foreign policy generally and co-operation in 
external support for democratization abroad specifically. 
 
Strategy 
 
According to Carothers (1997) - described on the cover of his most recent book (2004) as ‘the world’s 
leading authority on democracy promotion’ - the United States’ strategy for democracy assistance has 
at best been partial, ill thought-out and inadequate. In contrast European democracy promoters are 
reported to ‘lament the lack of overarching “systematic thinking”’ that characterises the EU’s own 
efforts  (Youngs, 2003: 131). But if the quest for a grand strategy for promoting democratization has so 
far proved elusive (see Burnell, 2004a) then in politics the meaning of the very term strategy is not easy 
to pin down. The term may be ubiquitous but there is no substantial conceptual debate, game theoretic 
literature aside. The literature on democracy promotion is for the most part silent on how strategy 
differs from ‘models’, ‘policies’ and ‘approaches’ or, indeed, tactics; critiques of the absence of 
strategy sometimes conflate a ‘strategic’ approach with a ‘more political’ approach while concentrating 
on exploring failings of more technical kind. Traditionally the idea of having strategies and of thinking 
strategically is more at home in a military context. Indeed the discipline of strategic studies can be 
defined as inquiries into the ways actors use their military capability to achieve political goals. 
Increasingly however ‘strategy’ has been appropriated by business studies - the worlds of product 
development, marketing, and corporate financial strategy; while in psephology - a sub-discipline of 
politics – there is the unhelpful remark that ‘the terms tactical voting and strategic voting are 
synonymous’  (Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, 2003: 531). Different contexts, then, suggest 
different models. But a minimum consensus would define strategy as an outline of how to achieve 
goals: the goals are the objective; a strategy sets out the route to that objective, and ideally should 
estimate the likely cost. Hence thinking strategically is to employ reasoning about means-ends 
relationships; it offers a framework within which policies and institutional mechanisms can be worked 
out.  Also, strategy should assesses the chances that unwanted side-effects or by-products will put the 
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goal further out of reach. That is, it undertakes risk assessment. A strategy should both ‘rule in’ – 
provide guidance on what to do - and ‘rule out’ - guidance on what not to do.  Finally, strategy often 
connotes a game plan for the long term. While it is allowable that ‘winning the war’ might entail losing 
some of the battles along the way, it also means being able to recognise when the war has been won (or 
lost) and knowing when it is time to start thinking about what to do next. 
 
Strategies can range from simple to complex; ‘grand strategy’ suggests a comprehensive plan but it 
could still fail to envisage and prepare for every possible eventuality. To think strategically is not 
necessarily to have a good or optimum strategy, for the simple reason that commentators on these last 
two may disagree over the best route to take because they read the situation differently or owing to 
differences in how they conceive the ultimate goal. For instance in the case of consolidated democracy, 
how many years of stable democracy are needed in order to qualify, which institutional actors must be 
said to have accepted democratic ‘rules of the game’, and how widespread must be the conviction that 
the democratic transition is irreversible?   
 
Although ‘wait and see’ or ‘cautious inaction’ might be advisable when approaching certain situations, 
‘strategy’ usually implies purposive action. Preparing a defensive strategy can make sense in war or a 
game of chess, but the idea of being proactive makes most sense in respect of democratization support, 
so long as it recognises that the principal determinants of success could well be internal to the newly 
democratizing countries. The relationships between organisation and strategy are variable: the former 
may dictate the latter, but conversely organisational forms may be devised or reshaped to meet the 
demands posed by a politically-driven strategic choice. An ‘emergent’ strategy is one that adapts 
continuously to circumstances and the environment - particularly appropriate to something like external 
support for democratization, where our understanding both of the challenge of democratization and of 
the limits and possibilities of democracy support have evolved considerably over recent years. The old 
adage that ‘everything in strategy is very simple, but nothing in strategy is very easy’ also fits well the 
execution of democratization support, where the political realities on the ground are often uncertain and 
hard to predict.  
 
WHAT ARE THE GOALS AND WHY? 
 
A strategy for supporting democratization is not the same thing as the strategy that might lie behind the 
decision to give support to democratization - the reasons, motives or policy drivers. Ever since the fall 
of the Berlin Wall there has been confusion - or disagreement – over the primary purpose(s) of political 
strategies of external support for democratization and their theoretical justification. If democratization 
is sought largely for its instrumental value then what is the primary objective and how do we 
understand the relationships between the objects? If liberal democracy is but one of several ends 
desired by foreign policy, alongside national security, prosperity, global environmental sustainability 
and so on, is there a rank order or hierarchy?  Where are the synergies and what are the trade-offs? 
While democratization is not synonymous with political liberalization (indeed, either one can take 
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place without the other), the nesting of strategies for these two and for human rights as well raises 
questions about the connections among them. The absence of a clear, workable consensus on the issues 
among independent analysts runs parallel to the evasions or ambiguities often found in official 
statements of policy.  Big debates in social science over how economic, social and political changes 
interact – for instance the ‘causal’ connections among economic growth, social justice, 
democratization, and political stability, and the implications for a peaceful and prosperous global order 
– probably never will be fully resolved.  The choice of time-scale for assessing the evidence can make 
a huge difference to the findings. And while some widely-held belief might apply to a ‘good’ like 
democracy, as in for example the democratic peace thesis (democracies do not go to war with one 
another), contrary theorising characterises the process of realising that good (democratization). Up to 
the point when a liberal democracy finally consolidates in a country the path of political change can 
actually increase the chances that it will be belligerent, for a variety of reasons (Mansfield and Snyder, 
1995; Snyder, 2000). Notwithstanding all the disagreements, a clear sense of the status of any goal – 
such as a world order made up increasingly of democracies - and a reasoned understanding of why that 
would be desirable, could be considered a sine qua non of a convincing strategy for achieving it. 
 
The distinction between a strategy for supporting democratization and the strategic thinking that lies 
behind the decision to support democratization brings the nature of the foreign policy process into the 
foreground. For there is a special institutional sense in which strategies for supporting democratization 
abroad should begin much closer to home. Indeed for Carothers strategy appears to involve inter alia 
anchoring democracy support much more firmly in the larger foreign policy process.  A place at the top 
tables would raise the profile of democratization support and might reduce the damage from clashes 
and contradictions with the other policy goals. In regard to the Middle East for instance that would 
mean ‘taking significant political risks and expending real political capital that up to now has been used 
in the service of economic and security interests’ (2004: 250). In a broadly similar vein The Hague 
Statement on Enhancing the European Profile in Democracy Assistance (Netherlands Institute for 
Multiparty Democracy, 2004) says democracy assistance should be a ‘core business of EU external 
policy’, not subservient to other foreign policy interests.  
 
These are arguments both for a more ‘joined up’ approach to foreign policy-making in government and 
for winning the argument for democracy support vis-à-vis other policy objectives among a wider public 
at home –  in the US the Congress and the wider electorate, where a 2004 survey by the Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations reported that popular support for promoting democracy had fallen to 
14%, the lowest figure since the survey began in 1974 (Financial Times September 28, 2004).  Such 
findings put the claim that ‘We need to democratize foreign policy so that both process and content 
reflect the values inherent in open democratic societies’ (Democracy Coalition Project 2002: 8) in a 
new light. The need to mobilise public support has also been argued in respect of a strategy of pre-
emptive action to prevent potentially failing states becoming ‘rogue’ states, by the Commission on 
Weak States and US National Security (2004). The policy implications of that recommendation may 
not always coincide with the goal of supporting democratization. However the Commission went on to 
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propose a new ‘strategy’ for spreading democracy too, namely first calculate the likely financial costs 
of such a policy so as to be able to bid more effectively in the competition for scarce public resources. 
As an exercise in accountancy that looks highly improbable, given the many unknowns relating to 
democratization, although as a device to mobilise domestic support it might be politically shrewd. To 
be really useful, however, a comparable - and even more highly speculative - estimate of the likely 
costs of not supporting democratization abroad would have to be brought into the equation too. 
 
Moreover even the strategy of seeking a more joined-up approach to foreign policy generally could 
have ambivalent effects. At the intellectual level it certainly makes good sense for the policy 
community/practitioners who support democratization and, say officials charged with managing 
international development co-operation to talk to one another often. The donor community has not 
systematically allocated development aid to more democratic countries (Svensson, 1999), and so there 
is a strong case for examining the consequences for democratization of all aid programmes/ projects 
(including governance capacity-building), rather than concentrating on measuring the effectiveness of 
democracy assistance alone (Burnell, 2004c). Similar reasoning applies to the democratization effects 
of big policy initiatives in for example international trade and foreign investment, and to the way all 
countries are encouraged to adopt neo-liberal economic reforms almost irrespective of the social and 
political consequences. 
 
In theory all attempts at securing greater policy coherence or complementarity could be asked to 
observe the principle of ‘do no harm’ to democratization around the world. Yet the long established 
practice in the conduct of international affairs is for economic and security rationales to trump concerns 
for democracy. And that suggests the consequences could be rather different. The policy communities/ 
practitioner bureaucracies in development, or national security, and those in democracy support are of 
such unequal size and resources – with the former always under pressure to demonstrate quick results  - 
that there are dangers for the latter in getting too close to the former and their concerns. To illustrate, 
one argument for offering support to increased involvement by national parliaments and political 
parties in the governmental budget process is to make executives more accountable. That helps build 
democracy. But a more co-ordinated approach with the development economists could easily turn into 
an exercise for ‘educating’ the politicians to accept the harsh realities of fiscal discipline – and stop 
using parliamentary forums to press high spending demands.  A more integrated approach to policy 
then may lead to fewer not more concessions being made to the objective of democratization. 
Something like this seems to have happened already in respect of the Middle East Partnership Initiative 
(MEPI) - with a budget of $75 million - and the ‘war on terror’, in the US. Accordingly Carothers 
(2005) now argues MEPI should be moved out of the State Department and reconfigured as a private 
foundation, if it is to enjoy the kind of autonomy that will be essential to becoming a more effective 
instrument for democracy promotion. Anyway the broad speculation that democratization will advance 
such other and distinctive policy goals as national security or global prosperity is not yet fully 
underwritten by social science. Analysts collectively present different views on the relevant means–
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ends relationships, they vary their hypotheses according to the time frame and, often, venture only 
cautious and highly qualified interpretations of the data.  
 
In sum, strategy cannot be discussed in isolation from the reasons for promoting democratization and 
the relative weights that are attached to different policy goals, the linkages between them, as well as 
issues to do with institutional balance of power. 
 
SUCCESSFUL STRATEGY 
 
Investing in devising and then implementing a strategy suggests a strong commitment to achieving the 
objective, a keen desire to be successful. Strategies are more likely to achieve their objectives if they 
incorporate the lessons of past successes and learn from any failures. But where the objective is 
democratic progress, what constitutes success? The increase in number of democracies in the world is 
not itself proof of successful external support. So how do we know if support is successful? 
 
There is a small literature on the difficulties involved in measuring the effects of democracy support 
and assessing its wider impact on democratic institutionalisation (for example Crawford 2003). Even 
where individual democracy programmes/ projects can be evaluated by some measurable output, for 
example the number of new civic associations established by foreign funding, aggregating the results 
into some verdict for civil society as a whole and then estimating the long term consequences for 
democratization are both methodologically fraught. Assigning specific causal responsibility could well 
nigh be impossible given the number of direct and indirect influences, domestic and international that 
have a bearing on politics and political change. By comparison the question ‘what would success look 
like?’ looks more manageable. In practice, however, even the answer to that is far from 
straightforward. 
 
First, there is the distinction between success in terms of achieving democratic progress and success 
constructed in terms of the underlying reasons or rationales that motivate the external support. 
Achievement understood in the one might not deliver what was hoped for in the other.  In practice the 
official statements about the democratic objectives of democratization support often tend to be too 
vague or imprecise for rigorous assessment, and taken in the round they are not wholly consistent.  
 
Second, there are alternative ways of defining success, and they would produce different results. 
Outcomes could of course be measured against the actual state of democracy in the supporting 
countries. But the democracies of western Europe and North America have the benefit of many years of 
practice; they had the luxury of making incremental improvements over a long time. So this yardstick 
could be too demanding and the expectations overwhelming. Democratization’s external supporters 
first have to be clear about their objective: is it stable democratic governance, or ‘high quality’ 
democracy? But even the ‘mature democracies’ do not furnish exemplars or ideal standards for the 
latter. There is real concern there about declining levels of participation and trust in the politicians and 
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in the political institutions; political parties almost everywhere are said to be in trouble. And some 
long-cherished freedoms are being eroded as a consequence of anti-terrorist measures by the state and 
the encroachment of  ‘patriotism’ blended with the culture of fear. 
 
So an alternative is to define a democratic gold standard – or a framework for measuring the same - 
that no country has attained but which could be used to measure achievement. Who is best placed to 
formulate this, and should there be one universal model or are different versions appropriate for 
different societies? These are contested issues.  The idea that the societies that are being urged to 
democratize should themselves participate in determining the criteria for assessing democracy 
performance - and in deciding what constitutes successful support from abroad – is attractive but not 
easy to put apply. One response is the democratic audit, or democracy assessment, that Beetham et al. 
(2002) working for the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance have devised. It 
claims to offer an analytical framework that is valid for all societies, and which any society can apply 
for itself, yet remains sceptical about converting what are essentially qualitative judgments into 
quantitative scores or ranking countries along a single scale. But their inclusion of certain economic 
and social rights as defining properties of democracy - on the grounds that they are preconditions for 
the exercise of political and civil rights, and are outcomes of democracy - is debatable. What does this 
mean for all democracy’s other preconditions and likely outcomes?  The inference that a society could 
be denied democratic possibilities because it is as yet unable to secure certain economic and social 
rights is an uncomfortable one. The assessment methodology’s claims to both universalism and 
relativism - the democratic principles it enshrines are said to possess global reach but societies are 
licensed to operationalise them in a flexible fashion (‘internally generated benchmarks’) – looks 
ambiguous. Perhaps such issues are bound to arouse controversy. And the diplomatic rhetoric of 
democratization support is hardly different. For example the G8 Declaration on Partnership for 
Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa, issued 
in June 2004, ended up acknowledging ‘each society will reach its own conclusions about the pace and 
scope of change’. Movement towards (and away from) democracy is bound to be multi-faceted, so 
comparing the different aspects in order to summarise the trend and thereby assess the impact of 
external support is inherently value-laden. For instance is the emergence of a competitive political 
party system more significant than the development of a vibrant civil society? Should evidence of 
success in strengthening parties always count for more than successful support for autonomous civic 
associations? 
  
In any case democratization is generally thought to be a long drawn out process. It may not be 
irreversible unless certain stringent conditions are met, such as the US$6000 average per capita income 
that Przeworski et al. (1996) suggest is the tipping point. And choosing an appropriate moment(s) to 
assess whether a strategy of support has been successful is also problematic: it is as much political art 
as scientific timing. Democratization theorists have customarily distinguished between the breakdown 
of a non-democratic regime, transition to democracy (usually identified with the holding of the first set 
of reasonably free and fair elections), and democratic consolidation. But not only are the meaning of 
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democratic consolidation and its principal indicators much disputed, but what could look like evidence 
of successful support early on might have to be re-evaluated later, especially if – as sometimes happens 
– initial appearances of democratic progress turn out to be deceptive. 
 
Finally the gold standard approach or a universal framework alone cannot tell us whether progress 
should be measured in terms of where a supported country has reached or, instead how far and how fast 
it has travelled and the resistance that was met - the obstacles overcome - along the way. What 
allowance should be made for the baseline before the transition to democracy or support for 
democratization got under way; what consideration should be given to the degree of difficulty?   How 
can we compare ideas of progress – and compare the chances of achieving progress – for countries 
some of whom are just starting out on the path of political reform and others that may be further 
advanced but now show signs of regression or are entering a stationary state? These are all matters of 
judgment, inherently open to discussion, and analysts and democracy promotion agencies should 
devote mopre reflection to them. That the obstacles and constraints themselves may differ greatly from 
one place to another poses further complications.  It would be entirely wrong to assume that society is 
never a problem and that it is only the ignorance or objections of certain narrow and reactionary elites 
that stand in the way. A more fine-grained analysis is essential not least if a recommended strategy for 
external support is to concentrate on backing the likely winners (see Candidate Selection, below).  
 
Thus for instance on the scale of prospects for democratization that ranges from strong through fair to 
weak and impossible to predict, the range of different situations that greets external actors includes the 
following. In the most promising cases both the government and surrounding political elite and much 
of society too are broadly sympathetic towards democratization, violent civil conflict is absent and 
society has the broad capability to operate a democracy. The former Baltic republics of the Soviet 
Union after the fall of communism are an example. The fair category includes a number of possibilities 
possessing diverse characteristics. One is where is the regime is determined to resist change but society 
is both enthusiastic and ready for democracy: the benefit of hindsight says Spain around the time of the 
fall of Franco is a case in point. Another is where ‘project democracy’ has firm allies and some 
significant opponents in the country and where what could prove most challenging for attempts to 
democratize is the number and behaviour of semi-loyal supporters - the fair-weather friends  - whose 
co-operation is conditional, their enduring support cannot be guaranteed. Georgia and Armenia 
possibly fit this description as do a number of countries in Africa. The weak category obviously 
includes countries where the regime is resistant and significant sections of society are unprepared or are 
ill-equipped to assume the obligations and responsibilities of western-style liberal democracy. Perhaps 
the people are indifferent, hostile even, to some of its demands. While Cuba and North Korea might 
look like extreme examples, equally unpromising are situations of regime collapse, state fragility, and 
violent civil disorder currently or in the recent past, as in Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Liberia, and Somalia. Almost impossible to predict could be where the ruling group, or society, or both 
are deeply divided internally over the merits and desirability of reform or over the particular form it 
should take (Iran). The same could be said of brand new states or proto-states especially if their arrival 
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follows a period of violent conflict (East Timor; Eritrea) or international military intervention 
(Kososvo).  
 
To follow through with some implications for external democratization support, then, an entrenched 
authoritarian regime presiding over a functioning state and growing economy poses a (set of) 
challenge(s) very different from a failed state in an economy devastated by civil war but enjoying an 
opportunity to make a ‘fresh start’.  The case for constructing a credible paradigm that links 
democracy-building with external support in the distinctive conditions of a ‘post’-conflict environment 
- where both state-(re)building and nation-building could be essential - is especially urgent for 
countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. By their very nature these circumstances call for an overarching 
strategy - one that integrates with the more specific strategies for peace-building, state building and the 
generation of a sense of political community, and which understands the sequencing issues and 
complex choices or trade-offs that are bound to arise. One view is that in circumstances like Iraq’s the 
most important single task is to promote the rule of law, before insisting on elections (Dahrendorf, 
2004). A related argument is that in general priority should be given to state (re)building  (Ottaway, 
2002 and 2003). But a strategic decision to prioritise state security could lay down a pernicious form of 
path dependence, in which vested interests in frustrating democratization take a firm hold in the 
interim. If democracy is to be established later then renewed violent struggle – a ‘democratic 
revolution’ – might be required to make it possible. In reality what all this tells us that the 
categorisation of democratization prospects in terms of strong, fair and so on is crude and simplistic. A 
more complex disaggregation would identify more specific combinations of circumstances and permit 
closer identification of the degree of difficulty and prospects for success. This is important for 
candidate selection. 
  
Candidate Selection 
 
Determining the profile of a successful strategy for supporting democratization is not straightforward, 
when similar bodies of evidence can generate contrasting but equally plausible interpretations. 
Moreover additional complications exist over whether to define such a strategy not purely in terms of 
goal achievement but in relation to the cost or the resources expended. The resources expended on 
supporting democratization have an opportunity cost. An effective strategy would be one that delivers 
most ‘bang for the buck’. A strategic approach could mean being highly selective in the choice of 
candidates – making strategic choices in the sense of prioritising the likely winners.  For Carothers 
(2004: 48) for instance a strategic approach would not squander efforts on unpromising cases like 
Haiti. However political science’s predictive powers should not be exaggerated. It can agree on only 
the most abstract propositions concerning the conditions for successful democratization, such as some 
measures of national unity and socio-economic achievement, and even these are not iron laws. Quite 
apart from sharp disagreements about the relative causal significance of structural versus voluntaristic 
factors in explaining successful democratic transitions, different views exist on precisely which 
structural forces are most propitious. For instance Doorenspleet’s (2004) empirical investigation rejects 
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the traditional view that high economic growth is more favourable than low growth. She finds exactly 
the opposite and argues that peripheral rather core status in the world system is positive too. On that 
basis Haiti appears to be a strong candidate for democracy support.  
 
Of the societies that are starting from a very low democratic base and ones that seem ‘stuck in 
transition’ it may not be obvious which ones will make most democratic progress.  In any case a 
strategy of backing winners could end up reinforcing existing tendencies whereby democracy support 
works best where it is least needed.  That implies double jeopardy for the societies that are left behind, 
which seems morally unacceptable if democracy really is a universal value. Indeed, in respect of 
allocating conventional development assistance many commentators have long argued that a more 
needs-based approach is the most defensible and is most likely to maximise popular support back 
home. Where support to democratization after conflict could help prevent a society from returning to 
violence, then even if the kind of ‘democracy’ that emerges is not full liberal democracy the returns on 
the investment in support will be magnified. And needless to say ‘backing winners’ does not 
necessarily explain the reality of contemporary policy such as the US’s decision to focus on Iraq. Of 
course the alternative of a ‘scattershot’ approach would hardly be more credible. That could easily 
damage the reputational power of democratization’s external supporters once they become associated 
with democratic break-throughs that then stagnate or go into reverse, and especially if support is 
withdrawn prematurely. To signal that there is little appetite for a sustained commitment could have 
negative repercussions for democratization elsewhere. That would be bad strategy,  
 
For more constructive guidance on ‘where’, we could turn to the so-called ‘neighbourhood effect’, a 
proposition that claims the chances of registering democratic progress are greater in countries which 
have borders with other democracies or democratizing countries. (consistent with findings in 
Dorenspleet 2004). One possibility, then, is that a strategic decision to concentrate support 
geographically would offer the greatest benefits. A similar principle could apply to matching up 
‘partners’, for example the suggestion that Poland should be in the vanguard of EU attempts to advance 
democracy’s cause in Ukraine and Belarus. Nevertheless, now that everywhere the easy victories for 
democratization have already been won, candidate selection for future support is becoming harder. 
Hence the case for sound strategy is more compelling than ever. This issue is especially pertinent to the 
European Union, and not merely because its global reach does not match that of the US. Since 1989 the 
most obvious countries for the EU to concentrate on for geo-strategic reasons have also been countries 
where the predisposing conditions for democratization - economic attainments; a previous history of 
democratic experiments; solid experience of political party organisation and so on - were already 
favourable. That happy coincidence is now drawing to a close.  Of course the fact that the post-
communist countries had to grapple with multiple economic as well as political transformations 
suggests that the challenge even there was anything but easy. But that only goes to show how 
problematic is the business of predicting – in order to support - winners. 
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Looking forward, realists have no difficulty in arguing that democratization support should (continue 
to) prioritise those countries/regions where there are important security or other national interests that 
would be advanced by political change. Indeed the US’s ‘Greater Middle East democracy initiative’ 
delineated that region more in terms of its relevance as a ‘security region’ for the US than in terms of 
any shared potential for democratic progress. For the European Union in contrast a (continuing) focus 
on its ‘near abroad’ (Balkans, southern Mediterranean, and eastern Europe as far as the Urals) could 
well be the obvious strategic choice. An alternative option would play on historical relationships. Quite 
apart from any moral obligation that might be thought to arise (such as from a former colonial tie or a 
bungled attempt to transfer democracy at independence), a unique empathy or special access might be 
claimed in regard to some sub-Saharan African countries, so aiding the chances of success. A very 
different starting point would be for supporters of democratization to trade on the special advantages 
that derive from their own unique political history. Having constructed a lasting peace following 
centuries of violence - through building the European Union after the second world war and then 
overcoming the ‘cold war’ inside Europe – Europe has strong claims to offer something relevant to 
democratization in ‘post’-conflict situations. The US has its own ‘backyard’, but a further option is for 
Europe to identify places where the US’s difficulties are Europe’s opportunities. Wherever the issue of 
democratization is confused with overbearing American power and creates a resentment that blights the 
outlook for democracy, a division of responsibilities would suggest that Europe take the lead. Thus 
although at the global level a (more) strategic approach to supporting democratization recommends 
greater co-ordination among the main actors – something that has long been canvassed for international 
development co-operation - in some settings a successful strategy could still be served best by doing 
things separately.  
 
DEMOCRATIZATION SUPPORT: THE LITERATURE 
 
Carothers’ idea of a ‘democracy template’ (1999: 86) – comprising electoral process, state institutions, 
and civil society, reflecting an idealised view of US liberal democracy– arranges the typical 
components of conventional democracy support. First there are goals for each of these three ‘sectors’, 
such as free and fair elections, and then individual forms of assistance, for example international 
election observation. The simplest strategy for support refers to choices among these three sectors and 
their components. The political situation in a country decides where to allocate most attention; strategy 
involves making adjustments to reflect local political circumstance as they are interpreted (ideally) by 
well-informed observers. In practice overall strategy has evolved from an initial emphasis on 
supporting elections through to a considerable faith in the development of civil society. Even so, that 
kind of progression has been more reactive than planned and could equally well be said to reflect 
merely tactical shifts. In any case a systematic approach would insist on close co-ordination of support 
between the three sectors. 
 
Carothers’ own reflections on a more comprehensive strategy inspire not one but several themes, such 
as giving democratization support greater priority within the foreign policy process and allocating it 
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more selectively. But his core recommendation rests on the persuasive idea that strategy must be firmly 
grounded in an understanding, or theory, of the process of democratization. He advances this as a 
critique of the attachment to a ‘normal’ sequence of change and the practice of ‘institutional modelling’ 
that the US (and by extension others) have favoured in the past. Past endeavours to transfer formal 
institutional designs – an endpoint approach that aspires to bridge the gap with reality through 
transferring knowledge and training - ignores both how democracy originated in the US and Europe 
(Carothers, 1997: 117) and the processes by which it could emerge elsewhere today.  The approach 
treats symptoms and not causes.  In place of such a universal recipe Carothers advises that a typology 
of different strategies should be developed, as would befit a typology of ‘political transitions’ that 
resembled the diversity in the real world. The logic is compelling; and for Carothers (2004: 167-83) it 
dovetails with his thesis that the old ‘transition paradigm’ – which specified political opening followed 
by breakthrough followed by democratic consolidation - is now obsolete.  A more complex and 
variable picture exists today, and contains partial and interrupted cases of democratic advance and 
democratic retreat, together with frozen or stalled cases of what might be called transition to nowhere. 
Indeed there is not one process of democratization but instead multiple patterns of greater and lesser 
degrees of political change: in many places the direction of change remains uncertain or is problematic.  
 
At minimum then a strategy for supporting democratization should distinguish between stubbornly 
authoritarian cases, partial but ongoing transitions, backsliders, and stable semi-authoritarian regimes, 
as well as treat ‘post-conflict’ situations as sui generis (see also Gershman, 2004).  Of course the 
reasons why democratic transitions sometimes falter may differ from case to case and the question of 
what strategy to adopt is particularly important, not simply because the cases are so numerous. 
Comparative statistical analysis finds intermediate regimes or semi-democracies, not full-blown 
autocracies to be the most prone to internal repression  (Regan and Henderson, 2002) and most 
susceptible to violent internal conflict (Hegre et al. 2001; Mousseau, 2001). Yet such regimes seem 
able to acquire a degree of permanence. So, a strategy for support that only weakens authoritarianism, 
or promotes democratic opening but disengages at the point where an illiberal democracy becomes 
entrenched, would be reprehensible.  A more far-sighted approach would first estimate the chances of 
making largely uninterrupted progress towards liberal democracy and the time it would take to get 
there and estimate  the ‘collateral damage’ to citizens’ rights or human security along the way. A risk-
reduction strategy for dealing with the interim should feature in the policy deliberation. 
 
The ‘Carnegie Perspective’ 
 
Washington DC’s Carnegie Endowment for International Peace does not normally take institutional 
positions on public policy issues. But in what might be called an unofficial perspective some of its 
leading analysts of democratization make an assumption that ‘politics involves competing interests, 
struggles over power, conflicting ideologies, and clashing values’ (Carothers, 1997: 123). With few 
exceptions ‘democratic transformation has always been a conflictual, though not necessarily violent 
process’ (Ottaway, 2004: 15); democratization in authoritarian countries cannot occur ‘without real 
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politics and without conflict’ (Hawthorne, 2004: 19). And when noting the incidence of ‘mass politics 
of a conflictual nature’, (Hawthorne (2004: 19) observes such ‘politics are often accompanied by 
extensive unrest and violence…fundamental change is always destabilizing to a certain extent’. A 
strategic approach to supporting democratization where the rulers are resistant would identify the 
groups outside the power structure who have both the will and the potential capability to mount a 
serious challenge to the government’s hold on power (Carothers, 1997: 128). This calls for ‘interest-
oriented methods of political assessment’. It demands measures that will ‘empower those people and 
organisations who wish to fight to change the patterns of representation’ (Carothers, 2000: 154). 
Political initiatives that are supported at the societal level really must challenge the ‘underlying 
relations of power’; too often, it seems, civil society support has been merely a harmless form of 
outdoor relief.  The prospects for democratization in the Arab world in particular depend on the growth 
of popular constituencies who at minimum see democracy as a means to gain power and further their 
interests – motivations that initially might dwell on the anticipated economic and social benefits 
(Ottaway, 2004: 6).  
 
In this perspective, then, a strategy for external support would combine a selective targeting of 
countries with a more focused approach to targeting those groups inside countries who look most likely 
to make a difference - the real agents of change. It would aim to convert their potential capability into 
effective action. That means extending support beyond the ‘usual suspects’: single–issue advocacy 
groups and service-delivery non-governmental organisations, which may lack roots in society. 
Nevertheless, the devil will be in the detail: identifying and choosing among groups that have both the 
will and potential to make an impact, as well as determining what weight to give any pro-reform 
figures in exile, who might have little standing in their own country.  An important question is what 
political methods, tactics and strategies by such groups should be given more support?  Activities that 
come to mind range from street demonstrations and other forms of mass protest that could well be in 
breach of the law to outright civil disobedience. Political strikes and ‘voting with your feet’ might be 
possible even where elections are denied, such as by refusing to pay taxes, resisting conscription, and 
seeking sanctuary abroad. But if as a last resort people do begin to court violence - the ‘ultimate form 
of politics’ (Miller, 1962: 15) - or if the authorities’ response to civil disobedience and peaceful riots is 
brutal repression, then what should democratization’s external supporters do next? After all, ‘political 
violence erupts easily when power shifts are occurring’ (Carothers, 1999: 337). The silence over what 
to do in such circumstances is deafening. But the conundrum should not be underestimated, if 
Bermeo’s (2003) finding from comparative historical analysis still applies today. Bermeo claims that 
the culprits who are chiefly responsible for overthrowing emerging democracies are not the ordinary 
people but small elite coalitions, overreacting to popular protest, strikes and occasional violence. It 
would be unimpressive tactically and ethically indefensible to encourage groups to take up conflict 
only to leave them exposed to oppression once an authoritarian regime reacts harshly, as happened in 
Iraq at the end of the 1991 Gulf war. It would be understandable if a reputation for behaving 
inconsistently like this eroded confidence in external support across a wider set of countries. 
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Of course Carothers (1999:105) knows that recognising the importance of comprehending the 
underlying interests and power relationships in a society does not of itself mean that such influential 
factors can be easily shaped. Two features of a strategy that seek to address this challenge are time and 
pressure. First, ‘strategy’ seems to imply an unwavering commitment - for however long it takes. That 
includes maintaining support during what Dahrendorf (2004) has called  the ‘valley of tears’. That is 
the period following authoritarian breakdown or democratic transition when society’s high expectations 
might be disappointed and democratic enthusiasm could easily wane. This simple strategic advice says 
two things: be prepared for a long haul, and attach more weight to sustainable long run developments 
than to short-term concessions. However, supporting change through to some kind of completion poses 
a benchmark that will be difficult to define, not least because democratic progress is not irreversible, 
even could be even harder to measure. Nevertheless, similar recommendations exist in critical accounts 
of international involvement in post-conflict reconstruction/peace-building that reject the external 
actors’ usual preoccupation with having an exit strategy. The second feature, namely pressure, 
introduces the interesting possibility that strategy could mean adopting a more muscular approach to 
leveraging democratic change. 
 
Carothers indicates he would support more ‘pressure’ and a ‘greater level of interventionism’ (for 
example 2004: 263; 2005: 7)) to render support to democratization in the Middle East specifically and 
in semi-authoritarian states more generally.  Although diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument has 
been called ‘one of those infuriatingly vague terms that can have different meanings depending upon 
user and usage’ (White, 2001: 388), ‘diplomatic pressure’ is a ‘potentially critical element of a pro-
democratic policy’ (Carothers, 2004: 263). In the Middle East a direct approach would ‘use a 
combination of aid for democracy and diplomatic engagement to push (my emphasis) Arab 
governments to begin building bridges’ (2004: 246) towards democratization.  This goes beyond a 
polite exchange of views and reasoned argument, that is to say persuasion (‘pure diplomacy’). Pressure 
from without is required if (semi-)authoritarians are to be persuaded that their interests or the interests 
they represent would not be served by resisting clamours  for reform from domestic, externally-
supported groups. But what does this means in practice?  
 
As a political concept, pressure is undertheorised. Though seemingly harmless in everyday accounts of 
pressure/interest group activity, the concepts ‘pressure against’ and to be ‘put under pressure’ evoke an 
exercise of power, potentially coercive even if propelled by benign intent. At minimum there is the 
deliberate introduction of a cost to the target: the inconvenience and opportunity cost of the resources 
put into offering resistance. When pressure is effective, the ‘target’ is caused to concede, to do 
something it would not otherwise choose to do; compliance may then bring further political or other 
costs. Furthermore, the perceptions that are held on the two sides of a relationship or among different 
targets of similar pressure can differ greatly, especially where the actors have different baseline 
expectations. Thus what is claimed and, perhaps, genuinely believed by the source of pressure to 
comprise nothing more than an offer, can be received as something much more threatening, or sinister, 
than that. 
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 ‘Diplomatic pressure’, then, is a black box of power relationships – actions as well as words (‘quiet 
diplomacy’) - ranging from inducements (irresistible or otherwise) and incentives (‘positive 
conditionalities’) to binding contracts and ‘negative conditionalities’ (deterrents and punishments) and 
other devices. In extremis there is diplomatic isolation and a range of other sanctions. In practice 
diplomatic pressure often employs some combination of these at any one instant or over a period of 
time, such as an offer with strings together with (implied) threat if the offer is declined. None of the 
Carnegie writers commends military imposition of democracy - where the historical record is weak 
(Pei and Kasper, 2003; Gates and Strand, 2004). Although if the issue is about restoring state security 
in failed states, Ottaway and Mair (2004) say the options range from ‘co-opting to controlling or 
fighting’ noncivil power-holders.  Everyone also knows that excessive foreign pressure can sometimes 
be counterproductive, stiffening a regime’s determination to oppose reform and giving it an instrument 
to distract the domestic audience, as in Cuba.  But the question how far a strategy of applying pressure 
for democratic progress can legitimately and usefully travel along the continuum from offers to threats, 
from very ‘soft’ to very ‘hard’ (more coercive) forms of power is usually left ambiguous or 
unconvincing. Sometimes the issue is coyly rolled into condemnations of  ‘top-down’ approaches to 
supporting democratization, where the comments refer mainly to elite-brokered institutional reforms 
that frustrate civil society (‘bottom up’) initiatives, without elucidating the role of external pressure. 
The issue is especially cloudy where society is genuinely divided over the merits of moving in a more 
democratic direction, as in Ukraine’s December 2004 presidential elections. Almost half the voters 
voted for aligning their country more closely with President Putin’s authoritarian-style Russia, and 
against the progressive democratic alternative.  
 
Simple calls for more pressure, then, simply cannot be squared with the rider offered by Carothers 
(2004: 248) that the external actor’s role remains no more than that of ‘advocate and enabler’. It is 
pressure on the anti-reform elements that enables the pro-reform elements to advance their cause.  And 
as yet there is no interventionists charter spelling out the who, how far and by what means external 
actors can legitimately lend support to groups ‘in conflict’, unless responding to a humanitarian 
emergency, the massive abuse of basic human rights, or as a last resort to preserve collective security. 
Where it is not these situations but democratization that is the goal, international law at present offers 
no clear endorsement. The implications for non-profit ‘non-governmental’ agencies that provide 
democracy assistance courtesy of public funding could merit especially careful consideration here. But 
clearly the greatest danger with a more muscular strategy is if the legitimacy of external support 
generally is thrown into doubt, where practices risk offending established norms of sovereignty or offer 
a poor international advertisement for liberal democratic notions of the rule of law. 
 
Democratization Support and Perspectives on Politics 
 
To summarise so far, operationalising strategy in a way that draws on the unofficial ‘Carnegie 
perspective’ on democratization and democracy support would involve both specifying more closely 
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the manifestations of political conflict that are entitled to support and opening up the ‘black box’ of 
diplomatic ‘pressure’. These grey zones might be defended as being more a matter of tactics than 
anything more fundamental. More striking, however, is that although the premise that strategy should 
start with analysing the process of democratization is compelling, an understanding of how that process 
comes about reflects – must reflect - something even more fundamental: a particular view of politics, 
the political process. 
 
The ‘Carnegie perspective’ on democratization sees politics as activity, more specifically conflict 
between groups in pursuit of their interests. In politics ‘principles trump interests only occasionally’ 
(Carothers, 1999:337). This perspective has a long tradition in American political science, for instance 
in the writings of Truman (1951: 514) for whom the activities of political interest groups in conflict 
comprise the very essence of politics. Even earlier, Bentley (1908: 222) argued that interest is ‘nothing 
more than the group activity itself’, and government is totally a matter of ‘pressure’; and similarly for 
Catlin (1930: 70), ‘Politics is a perpetual endeavour to avoid being baulked by one’s fellow-men’. 
These views reflect the way politics has always been conducted in the United States. They shape ideas 
about the well-springs of democratization, the connection being nowhere more explicit than in 
Latham’s (1952: 209) claim that politics may be properly understood ‘as the struggle of groups to write 
in their favour the rules by which the community is governed’. Conflict, then is not alien to democracy. 
Indeed it is democracy’s purported ability to manage and resolve conflict peacefully that is the origin 
of the advantage often claimed for it over other types of rule – those that rely on maintaining order by 
means of oppression, intimidation, or indoctrination.  
 
However, the above represents only one perspective on politics from among several possibilities, all 
having their own implications for how to understand democratization, and so, inferentially, for devising 
a strategy of external support. For instance a very different understanding of politics is one that can be 
called politics as belief, values and consensus. Thus Wolin (1961) portrayed politics as a life of 
common involvements: politics is synonymous with ‘public’, ‘common’, or ‘general’. Politics is about 
order, the common good and other solidaristic values. The political art is integrative; political society is 
no mere accumulation of self-regarding groupings. Politics, then, becomes an interpersonal process of 
communication (Roelofs 1968); in short, politics as talk rather than action. What this means for 
democratization is that political elites and non-elites must come to accept ownership of certain values, 
principles and norms; they must acquire some specific virtues. The feasibility of democracy rests on 
these assumptions about the normative potential of human beings, the ability to reach consensus on 
such matters as respect for others, tolerance, sociability, and common regard for the rule of law. It 
follows that support to democratic progress should transfer and encourage adoption of the same (‘norm 
cascade’), through strategies of partnership and dialogue that will lead to socialisation or social 
learning. Such a ‘values-based’ approach to democratization offers an alternative to the reasoning that 
stresses conflict as a weapon that groups will use to advance their interests. And it does indeed find an 
echo in democratization support, in the literature on ‘normative power Europe’. 
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‘Normative power Europe’ (Manners, 2002) – ‘normative power’ being the ability to shape 
conceptions of the ‘normal’ in such matters as peace, liberty, democracy; rule of law, human rights and 
norms like social solidarity and anti-discrimination - has been put forward as the EU’s distinctive 
contribution to strategic support for political change. Manners cited the abolition of the death penalty in 
many countries as an example of EU normative power. Norms are diffused by contagion (unintended), 
informational diffusion (‘strategic communications’), procedural diffusion (agreements), transference 
(such as technical assistance), overt diffusion (the EU’s presence in organisations or third states), and 
by a cultural filter (interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and 
political identity)(Manners, 2002: 244-5). These are examples of influence, not coercive power. So, 
‘engagement’ rather than conflict and certainly not diplomatic isolation characterises this approach to 
relations with states. Commentators have noted that European support for democratization does not 
connect with such ‘high-politics instruments of democracy promotion’ as strong pressure; and Europe’s 
policy-makers claim this distinction is a strength (Youngs, 2003: 134). Values and norms, not action 
(especially not coercion) take centre-stage; indeed, ‘the most important factor shaping the international 
role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is’ (Manners, 2002: 252). This modus 
operandi should not pose enormous difficulties for non-governmental actors in democracy promotion.  
 
However, even this version of a strategy for supporting democratization only takes us so far.  Reaching 
the broad mass of society can be made difficult by a hostile regime; steps to engage with elements of 
uncivil society may be politically unacceptable all round.  The line between socialisation and peer 
pressure is a hard one to draw: again, different actors may interpret the same activities differently. And 
the approach begs the question what to do next if persuasion or social learning fail, if democracy’s 
norms do not take hold. Thus although the theory accords closely with the widely-accepted view that 
for democratization to be sustainable anywhere it must be grounded in a sympathetic political culture, 
in reality the EU sometimes falls back on a more familiar blend of instruments. That has meant a 
certain amount of  ‘institutional modelling’ and forms of diplomatic pressure too, including very 
occasionally the imposition of aid sanctions. But the most notable example is the robust application of 
positive conditionalities – or more accurately preconditions - for accession to the EU. This has been 
called hard conditionality, serving democracy promotion through integration (Dimitrova and Pridham, 
2004). 
 
 Arguably these ex ante ‘agencies of constraint’ by the EU are currently being  elaxed somewhat in 
respect of certain prospective accession candidates, chiefly Romania and Turkey. And such 
conditionalities do constitute an obsolescing bargain.  Once EU membership has been secured, the 
deterrence of serious violations of democratic norms by members must rely on threats of diplomatic 
sanctions, possibly suspension, even though such measures cannot guarantee democratic advance. 
Membership of itself should create increasing opportunities for socialisation into democratic mores. 
That is, ‘locking in’ following accession enables a longer-term dynamic to set in: ‘normative power’ 
takes over, where conditionality expires. But notwithstanding the view of EU enlargement 
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commissioner Olli Rehn that ‘values define Europe, not borders’ (Financial Times January 4, 2005) 
only a handful of prospective new members remain. So it is not simply the specific  
 ex ante conditionalities but the overall strategy whereby conditionality gives way to socialisation 
courtesy of accession that is obsolescing. The many countries that have or might expect some form of 
economic association with the EU or that receive EU development aid tied to certain political 
conditionalities hardly have the same incentive to comply. The threat of exclusion cannot apply to them 
any more than does the chance of experiencing post-accession socialisation. 
 
However, even if the idea of ‘normative power Europe’ and an emphasis on dialogue are shown to be 
an accurate portrayal of how Europe normally goes about supporting democratization, understanding 
why this approach has been adopted still takes us back to its instrumental worth. The benefit that 
values-transfer offers to Europe’s geo-strategic interests such as security and not some pure unselfish 
commitment to universal objectives of democratization and human rights, still appears central to the 
explanation (see for example Olsen, 2000 and Youngs, 2004b). 
 
BEYOND ‘OUTDSIDE – IN’: SUPPORTING DEMOCRATIZATION IN AN AGE OF MULTI-
LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
 
It is often said that studies of democratization’s ‘third wave’ initially focused on domestic politics and 
only later brought positive international influences into the analytical frame. Yet both in the literature 
and in the practical world of external support too little reference is made still to the way the 
international context sets limits to the kind and extent of democracy that can be built. The point is not  
that the thinking embodied in external support programmes moulds the theoretical conceptions of 
democracy and the democratic designs in the new democracies, that is the influence of outsiders on the 
domestic politics. That important issue has certainly been aired in respect of US and European 
institutional formulae and the larger claim that they promote a narrow market form of democracy rather 
than economic and social democracy, to suit their geo-economic objectives (Smith, 2000). Instead the 
point being made here is that a comprehensive political strategy of external support would address the 
kinds of challenges to democratization posed by globalization, in particualr the growth of multi-level 
governance. The point has particular relevance to the EU’s newest members, because of the democratic 
deficit that lies at the heart of the EU, but is not confined to those countries. The challenge is most 
problematic for small, weak and economically dependent states in the developing world.  
 
The challenge of going beyond an ‘outside-in’ strategy of democratization support stems from the way 
a powerful, multi-layered ‘global governance complex’ is shrinking the space available for national 
political self-determination. For instance there are reckoned to be over 6,500 regulatory agencies at the 
international level, plus the ‘privatisation’ of governance to bodies like the bond rating agencies. None 
of these organisations are democratically accountable. Through their appropriation of important 
decision-making powers there is a danger that democracy’s credibility will be devalued: political 
apathy and cynicism are possible consequences, in new democracies.  Mkandawire (1999) coined the 
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term ‘choiceless democracies’ to characterise the external constraints on elected governments to 
formulate their economic policies from within the neo-liberal range, perhaps going against popularly 
expressed wishes at the ballot box.  By overriding the principle of responsiveness to electors, the point 
of political representation comes into question. Furthermore, the national political space where self-rule 
still remains an option is being penetrated increasingly by a variety of non-accountable external actors 
(not just the agencies of democratization support), of which transnational corporations are only the 
most visible. By establishing a presence there and attracting local allies they can capitalise on their 
great regional or global financial, economic and political clout to capture disproportionate influence in 
the domestic policy and decision-making processes. Once again, then, power and influence over their 
own affairs are being denied to the mass of ordinary people, for whom the formal freedoms newly 
gained from political liberalisation and democratization can appear to carry little weight. 
 
This means that a comprehensive strategy of external support for democratization would not only 
reflect on power relations and conflicts within states but must also take account of transboundary and 
supraterritorial forces that are bearing down on the prospects for meaningful democracy. Historically 
democracy was devised for an epoch when the nation state was truly sovereign; in many respects the 
situation facing emerging or prospective new democracies especially in the developing world is 
significantly different. However, whether these new problems for democracy can be addressed 
satisfactorily within the confines of a globalizing world system and on the basis of trying to preserve 
the established order of states is the subject of considerable, on-going debate. On the one side there are 
‘ hyper-globalizers’ (see Cerny, 1999) for whom the nation state is just about finished as a credible unit 
of government. On the other hand there are globalization theorists like McGrew (2005) who suggest 
the Westphalian ideal of sovereign statehood is not obsolete but simply being transformed, and that 
opportunities to introduce a new, more democratic form of global politics do exist. ‘Cosmopolitan 
democracy’ seeks to reinvigorate democracy within states by extending democracy to relations 
between and across states. Needless to say consideration of such radical and speculative ideas goes 
well beyond this article. Here it is possible only to illustrate some incremental implications for practical 
democratization support.     
 
First, increasing global governance and its effects highlight the limitations of the ‘electoralist fallacy’ 
even more than ever. Efforts to improve elections management aimed at reducing irregularities and 
boosting voters’ confidence in the fairness of the electoral process do not address the major issue: does 
it really matter who wins? Progress towards freer and fairer elections that still leave government 
hostage to extraneous interests or beholden to institutions external to the electoral process, hardly 
advance democracy. Notwithstanding the well-known double turnover test for democratic 
consolidation, some of the concern currently expressed by democratization’s supporters that elections 
be able to produce alternations in government should be devoted to enhancing the opportunity for 
elected governments to reflect in action the expressed wishes of the electorate. Strengthening their 
institutional capabilities to engage in policy dialogue with for instance the international financial 
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institutions is necessary for them to give stronger representation to particular national interests and 
demands.   
 
Second, external investment in constitutional crafting and advising on relations of vertical and 
horizontal accountability between the executive and domestic agencies of constraint, civil-military 
relations, and the decentralisation of administrative functions may barely affect the informal power 
structures located at the nexus of the domestic and international political economy. The moral is that 
we should not exaggerate the likely gains that accrue to liberal democracy, let alone for popular 
empowerment of the kind that Robinson (1996) prefers.   
 
Third, hitherto democratization support has devoted much attention to civic associations in new 
democracies – sponsoring such organisations’ capacity-building, funding their activities, and pressing 
governments to provide favourable legal and political context. The intention has been to strengthen 
civil society vis-à-vis the state in these countries. Of course a collection of civic associations neither 
makes a civil society nor guarantees that its relations with government - or society more generally - 
will strengthen democracy. No less important, far too little attention is given to improving civil 
society’s ability to make institutions of global governance more accountable. Support for strengthening 
regional and global networks could play an important role here. The emergence of global civil society 
is both a feature of globalization and a response to the way political power is leaking away from 
governments: its potential for democratization has not yet been fully realised.  Indeed some analysts 
(for example Scholte, 2004: 217) argue that global civil society offers the main hope for increasing 
democratic accountability in global governance.  External support could underwrite greater inter-
organisational collaboration among civic groups, in various ways. The construction and maintenance of 
transterritorial linkages should be capable of further the representation of nationally-based civic 
associations in the larger geographical forums. There they are more able to countervail powerful 
supranational institutions of economic and political governance. On the one side, national and also sub-
national associations will have more chance of being heard. On the other, the collective strength 
provided by cross-border networks can help national and sub-national associations fight their corner at 
home vis-à-vis their own government and the locally represented external interests including agencies 
of democratization support. That would offer a plus for democratization at the country level. 
 
Statements like the above do not ignore the democratic weaknesses that permeate the internal structures 
of many civil society organisations. But they do draw attention to the case for trying to overcome both 
the ‘nationalist, statist and territorialist mindsets’ (Scholte, 2004: 230) and the absence of self-critical 
reflection found among civic associations everywhere. Also they invoke the case for opening up 
democratic space within the institutions of global governance themselves – something that 
democratization’s external supporters have hitherto been completely oblivious to. And of course they 
argue also for promoting democratic principles within the regional/global structures of civil society 
representation. Typically the high profile international civil society movements tend to be dominated 
by members from the West, where superior wealth and technical expertise mean that it is they who 
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typically set the agendas.  In a similar vein the modest resources the European Commission has 
allocated to networking among civic actors, as part of its democracy and human rights initiatives for 
the southern Mediterranean have disproportionately favoured bids from European organisations. In the 
long run greater commitment to helping organisations in North Africa could prove more effective.   
 
Political Parties: an Expanding Frontier for Supporting Democratization 
 
Finally, Central and Eastern Europe have seen many recent examples of external encouragement to the 
political parties (see for example Pridham, 2001). But only now are some of the major democratization 
support agencies beginning to think about greatly expanding this form of support elsewhere (lengthy 
involvement by Germany’s party foundations constitutes an exception). Whereas formerly support to 
civil society had become fashionable (once the full significance of the ‘electoralist fallacy’ gained wide 
recognition), so political society, more specifically the parties’ central importance to representative 
democracy is now registering increasing attention (for example Burnell, 2004b). Certainly it pushes 
democratization support towards becoming more closely involved in sensitive domestic political 
affairs.  But to believe that by neglecting parties and concentrating on civic associations, 
democratization’s international supporters can avoid being political and yet still help bring about 
democracy, is probably false on two counts. First, for civil society to make a difference it must play a 
political role. Supporting mainly associations that only confirm the basic contours of the political status 
quo is not unpolitical, but instead exerts its own political bias. Second, there are limits to what any civil 
society can achieve, especially for democratic consolidation. So, a strategy for democratization must 
address the weaknesses that afflict parties. Sustainable democracy requires parties that are fit to 
exercise power, and it needs parties that are capable of holding government to account. However, ‘the 
international community has rarely had a coherent and comprehensive strategy for party development 
in a country…donors have selected specific areas of assistance largely on the basis of local openings, 
available resources, and their own interests’ (Kumar, 2004: 7). So, the obvious question is how to go 
about it? 
 
Support for parties in any country must not be divorced from an idea of what an appropriate party 
system would look like. And that in turn relates to an understanding not only of the functions parties 
and party systems perform for stable democracy, but also the role they can play in processes of 
democratization, which could be subtly different. Hitherto party support has been conceived at the level 
of the individual parties, especially around election time. The aim: to help with campaigning; the 
objective: to replicate parties as we know them in the established democracies. The consequences for 
democratization have been left to take care of themselves.  A more strategic approach would invert the 
ladder: begin by identifying what society most needs, wants and expects from democratization 
generally and party politics specifically. Then draw inferences for the party system and parties and 
identify the conditions that must be fulfilled - the processes of change - that would address the relevant 
shortcomings. From that analysts will learn what, if anything, external actors can do to help, and how.  
For example, different approaches to and different programmes of support would be indicated where 
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what is sought most by society from party politics is social reconciliation and political integration on 
the one side, or wider economic policy choices and competent economic governance on the other. A 
strategy for support would address these sorts of considerations at the systemic level. And whereas it is 
the connections that the parties have with the state that are most noticeable in many  new democracies, 
so external support could aim at correcting the bias by strengthening parties’ links with society. A 
greater social rootedness of political parties would make a significant contribution to democracy-
building, in the estimation of most writers on the parties’ dimension of democratization. But so far 
much of the debate among external support actors has concentrated too narrowly on the respective 
merits of bipartisan versus multi/non-partisan models of support. The former excels at rendering 
support rooted in a particular ideological orientation; the latter could have greater advantages for 
sharing the values of democracy per se.  
 
Finally, there is scope for external agents to support the development of closer relations between 
parties across the new and emerging democracies, in parallel to comparable efforts directed at civic 
associations. This networking too could be interpreted both as a manifestation of globalization and as a 
device to strengthen parties’ ability to cope with and respond to globalization’s more anti-democratic 
tendencies, at home and in institutions of multi-level governance. The European Parliament just such a 
vehicle, albeit with limitations. At the same time there is perception that external support has 
concentrated on parties that are willing to subscribe to neo-liberal economic principles instead of 
encouraging a wider ideological spectrum. Even if that is a myth, dispelling the myth would enhance 
the legitimacy of party support for democratization. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In politics strategy is a rather elusive term. The idea of political strategies for supporting 
democratization can have multiple referents: this analysis identifies not one but several propositions in 
search of a parsimonious concept, a coherent approach.  A strategy is more than just a route map; it 
involves a statement of the objectives and a clear understanding of the reasons why they are desired 
and the level of commitment that will be forthcoming. It must offer guidance on the who, the what, the 
when and above all the how of support to democratization, and by implication when not and how not 
to, as well. Although demands for an (improved) political strategy should not be confused with a geo-
strategic approach to supporting democracy, a realist perspective is that the former will probably have 
to accommodate to the latter in any case. That said, the call for a more strategic approach reflects an 
understandable impatience by critics who see democratization support as being excessively influenced 
by bureaucratic considerations. At best it has often appeared opportunistic by default; at worst nothing 
more than a tool for pursuing  (shifting and, at times, opposing) national security and economic goals.  
 
At least three distinct approaches emerge from the literature. First, reproduce familiar institutional 
models and invest in democratic capacity building; second, address the underlying power relations and 
engage in some way with group struggle for change; third engender support for a special set of norms, 
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values and principles associated with democracy. Carothers’ argument that a strategy for support 
should reflect a plausible theory of democratization – which incidentally must also include theorising 
why there is no democratization in some places, and its failures, the reversals and false starts - is 
correct but is only a starting point. For theories of political change (and stasis too) are relative: they rest 
on their own selection of ideas about what politics is. Thus the familiar debates in democracy 
promotion about direct versus indirect measures, about the significance of economic conditions for 
stable democracy and ‘top down’ versus ‘bottom up’ approaches conceal something more fundamental. 
What is most significant here is not that different perspectives on politics imply different views on 
what democracy can do for society - the reasons why it is desirable, democracy’s value. Certainly such 
views differ profoundly, especially when differentiating ‘good democracy’ from democracy. But, 
rather the fundamental point is that they tell different political stories about where democratization can 
come from - the underpinnings, what makes it feasible, and thereby what it requires from the 
international community.  If the difference could be summarised as two questions then one of them 
would reflect on how to change group power relations such that the interests of the greatest number can 
prevail. The second would ask how to move actors towards ‘owning’ liberal democracy’s defining 
values, principles and beliefs.  
 
A rational expectation is that external supporters of democratization will know their weaknesses and 
play to their strengths. Thus we would expect the US to be more ready to resort to ‘hard power’ and 
Europe to specialise in ‘soft power’ techniques. But it is inevitable that the potential gains for 
democratization from exerting strong pressure will be weighed against the costs. These might range 
from infringing World Trade Organisation agreements (where trade sanctions are threatened) to 
compromising humanitarian instincts, where the lever comprises aid denials as towards Mugabe’s 
Zimbabwe. Meanwhile in Azerbaijan we are told by a former US State Department and Pentagon 
official the US ‘would not want pro-democracy parties to take to the streets as they did in Georgia and 
Ukraine’ (Wayne Murray cited in Financial Times, February 21, 2005). Thus President Bush’s notion 
of ‘expending political capital’ in support of freedom while it may sum up anticipated returns of 
favours does not really capture all the repercussions that could follow across US foreign policy as a 
whole. Even so, prominent writers like Carothers recommend a bolder, more interventionist approach 
than has been employed to date, although not military coercion. There is a symmetry between the 
vocabulary used to understand politics within countries judged to be candidates for democratization 
and the recommendations currently being offered concerning how democratization’s external 
supporters should conduct themselves. One pairing emphasises conflict, interests and pressure, the 
other dwells on normative power, partnership and social learning. In both cases the terminology 
describes the essence of politics and says how foreign policy should support democratization. The 
contrast might be pushed even further. The former tries to mobilise what could be largely instrumental 
demands for political reform inside countries, and pursues democratization abroad as a means to other 
foreign policy goals.  In the latter, the foreign policy claims to value democracy and human rights for 
their own sakes and seeks to encourage wholesale conversion to these values in prospective new 
democracies.  In reality of course both models are ideal types and the comparison is overdrawn.  
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 In practice, then, Europe employs forms of pressure too; and politicians who come to espouse 
democratic values largely in order to qualify their states for EU membership can envisage no obvious 
disadvantage in doing so. The EU remains vulnerable to criticisms similar to those levelled against the 
US: both have employed ‘institutional modelling’ and neither has a wholly convincing strategy for 
supporting democratization outside of the easier cases. As politics is the art of the possible, a realistic 
strategy would recognise the limits of what external support can achieve.  Even when armed with a 
cogent theory of democratization it should harbour no illusions about where it is unable to make a 
constructive difference, about those parts of politics it cannot reach; ultimately, strategy would know 
when to stop.  
 
A sound approach to strategy would begin by attempting to secure the home base and then learning 
from the past. That means having built-in institutional response mechanisms and a corresponding 
organisational and political flexibility. The really obvious historical lesson is that the strikingly 
successful examples of democratization and its support – Germany and Japan after 1945; Central-
Eastern European countries after 1989 – probably have very limited application elsewhere. Perhaps the 
safest answer to the question of strategy then is to say that various approaches have some merit: 
democratization supporters should not confine themselves to selecting just one. At the same time they 
should be alert to the limits to candidate countries’ absorptive capacity for diverse support.  Strategies 
attuned to interest-based actors in conflict and strategies that put values-based commitments to the fore 
may compete in respect of which one offers the more mainstream perspective on politics – politics as 
talk versus politics as action. But they need not be entirely mutually exclusive in practice: politics is 
both talk and action. Strategies should be fashioned accordingly. The practical challenge then could lie 
in combining conflict and co-operation, in situations where imperfect information and political 
uncertainties regarding both the regime and societal actors on the ground can make forecasting the 
consequences problematic. Put differently, strategic thinking should dwell on how to help domestic 
reformers (‘norm entrepreneurs’) convert international (democratic) norms into powerful assets 
enjoying ascending influence in their struggle for political change.  
 
 Solutions, however, are likely to raise troublesome questions about the legitimacy of external 
intervention, and the rights and responsibilities of external actors. These are not yet addressed 
adequately or in a fully transparent manner in the democratization literature or in global public debate. 
Yet legitimacy, or the superior worth of liberal democracy/democratization/democrats by conviction 
over more instrumental rationalisations for these could be one of the most important keys to a truly 
successful foreign policy strategy for supporting democratization. Perhaps, then, a really visionary 
strategy would give priority to reconsidering the international legal framework for supporting 
democratization, address all the relevant normative issues, and proceed to place issues of strategy on a 
much firmer and transparent normative and legal base.  
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